Panentheism has recently become a widely accepted and appreciated concept among scholars in the science-theology dialogue, and its theological repercussions have been discussed to great extent. Yet, there remains to be studied in more detail the notion of the philosophical foundations of the term. A prominent gap in our understanding of these foundations is the potential similarity between the metaphysics of Hegel and Whitehead, their understanding of the transcendence and immanence of God, and their respective versions of panentheism. In this article, I present a critical reflection on the possible resemblance between process thought and Hegelian metaphysics and philosophy of God.
Introduction
That 'panentheism' has recently become a widely accepted and appreciated concept among scholars who committed themselves to the science/theology debate within the Anglo-American context is clear and undeniable. Ian Barbour, Philip Clayton, Paul Davies, Arthur Peacocke, and Keith Ward are some key figures supporting the claim that it is the concept of the world being 'in' God (pan-en-Theos), who at the same time surpasses it, that enables us to find a third way between classical theism and pantheism.
They all use panentheism to depict and explain a new model of divine action and a theological understanding of the processes and interactions occurring in the world described by natural sciences.
Because of its reference to the God-world relationship, panentheism tends to be regarded a purely theological concept. But it is not. Its origins are in philosophy and go back to Plato and Neoplatonism. Transmitted by Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena and Nicholas of Cusa, panentheism found new expression in German Idealism. It was within this philosophical tradition that the very term 'panentheism' (Allingottlehre) was coined (K.C.F. Krause) and the metaphysical shift from substance to subject found its culmination (G.W. Hegel).
1 God expressing or unfolding himself in the world is understood as the Creator who remains in a dynamic reciprocity with creation. This expressivist version of philosophical panentheism became a source of theological panentheistic propositions presented in the contemporary science/theology debate. investigate the question to see which of those two sources of panentheism is more popular among those scholars.
Similarities and differences
It appears to me that George Lucas is right when he says that comparing Hegel and
Whitehead one can discover and name a deep difference and division between European and Anglo-American philosophy. Those who practice the analytic and critical method in the Anglo-American context tend to be in a sharp contrast with advocates of a more systematic, synoptic and speculative European tradition. 8 However, there is a whole group of thinkers (including Lucas) who claim that the Whitehedian metaphysical perspective appears Hegelian in many respects. In what follows I examine critically some major similarities between the two philosophers in terms of their method and metaphysics.
System Builders
The first characteristic that can be regarded as a common feature of Hegel's and Whitehead's philosophy is their attempt to build a philosophical system. They are both interested in 'organic wholeness'. For many contemporary philosophers, such an endeavor is a sign of arrogance and boldness. Any pretense of finality and totality is rather disregarded at the time when new theories are expected and accepted only within narrow and specialist branches of knowledge of any kind. On the other hand, however, such holistic attitude in philosophy seems to be more legitimate in the age of science, which - This analysis shows some important similarities between the two philosophers.
They perceive reality as a process of becoming and transcend substance into the dynamic subject. Lucas rightly points out that for both of them Spinoza's concept of causa sui becomes a useful category in describing the 'ontological principle'. Hegel's dialectic, in which 'substance-subject' releases attributes out of itself, resembles Whitehead's actual entity which "is at once the product of the efficient past, and is also, in Spinoza's phrase, 15 In the Preface to On the other hand, however, one should not ignore some major differences between Hegel and Whitehead in their reinterpretation of Spinozism, and their shaping new metaphysical propositions. Though unfolding dialectically into many entities, the Hegelian Subject (Spirit) is one, and his metaphysics can be classified as idealistic monism. Contrary to this concept, Whiteheadian actual entities are many. Although they remain in the unity of relatedness, Whitehead's metaphysics is an example of pluralism. It can be also classified as another version of atomism, but this time it is an atomism that is balanced with continuity. Whitehead explains that the contradiction between the two terms is solved in a way similar to the physical description of both the corpuscular and the wave nature of light.
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The other difference between Hegel and Whitehead refers to finality and purposefulness. While Hegel regarded his dialectical unfolding of the Spirit in nature a purposive activity heading toward the finality of existing 'Real', Whitehead's process of concrescence has neither finality nor purpose other than the enjoyment of each particular actual occasion and God (the chief exemplification of actual occasions).
Dialectic and Process
Foregoing the comparison of Hegel and Whitehead's understanding of ontological principle of the universe remains incomplete and poses another crucial question. It refers to the very heart of their metaphysical systems, namely, the mechanics of Hegelian dialectics and Whitehedian process. Whitehead's process of concrescence within the individual actual entity, extends its mechanism to the prehension by the whole generation of actual occasions, and lists its phases: dative ingression, conformal physical feeling, conceptual feeling and comparative feeling. According to his view, the first two phases merge into one, and the whole mechanism resembles the Hegelian dialectical triad: immediacy, distinction and differentiation, and articulated synthesis. is not a random reference to past or future beings. Thesis and antithesis must be somehow 22 Harris, The Contemporary Significance, 24. 23 Ibid., 23. related (e.g. a negation of intuition is a sensual representation, instinctive desire is opposed to self-conscious recognition). Whitehead's prehension does not meet this requirement (actual occasion can prehend all kinds of data given in past occasions and various eternal objects).
The second possible interpretation of negation in Whitehead's philosophy is problematic for the same reasons. Harris claims that it is not prehension but rather 'negative prehension' that serves as dialectical negation in the process of concrescence of an actual occasion. 'Negative prehension' is a "definite exclusion of [a certain] item from the positive contribution to the subject's own real internal construction." 24 But again, is the excluded 'item' related to prehending actual occasion? Or is it chosen randomly?
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The third attempt to clarify the sense of negativity in Whitehead's metaphysics was presented by Gregory Vlastos, who distinguishes homogenous (logical) and heterogeneous dialectic. The former one is found in Hegel for whom all three stages of the dialectical triad "are ontologically homogeneous. Thesis, antithesis, and synthesis are all of the nature of Idea." 26 Unlike that of Hegel, Whitehead's dialectic is heterogeneous. Vlastos says that in the philosophy of organism thesis is material (physical), whereas antithesis is ideal (conceptual). Because of this heterogeneity neither the second dialectical stage can be generated from the first, nor the third from the second. Thus in this version of dialectic there is no space for an internal contradiction which is essential for homogenous dialectic.
Vlastos concludes that although it follows that in Whitehead's system dialectic can no longer be used as a heuristic principle, "it does not follow that it cannot be used at all. In so far as Whitehead makes use of the concept of internal relatedness, he must conserve a certain part of it: the dynamic fusion of polar opposites, the process from the abstract to the concrete. This is best shown in his basic metaphysical unit, the actual entity. Without the dialectic the actual entity can only appear (…) To sum up, one should have no doubt that there is some basic resemblance between the Hegelian dialectic and the Whitehedian process. However, a closer examination of this issue shows how many important nuances and differences emerge when the mechanics of both systems are compared. For this reason, one should be rather cautious in bringing them too easily to a common ground.
Whitehead and the British Idealism
At the end of this critical analysis of possible similarities between the Hegelian and Whitehedian metaphysics, I should refer one more time to Whitehead's own words quoted in the introduction. Is it right and useful at all to search for similarities between the two philosophers when one of them admits that he has never read the works of the Ellis, From Hegel to Whitehead, . 34 Whitehead, Process and Reality, xiii. 35 Ellis, From Hegel to Whitehead, 418. about Whitehead being influenced by Hegelian metaphysics is legitimate, at least to a certain extent.
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But does this similarity refer to the notion of God and his relation to the world in Hegel and Whitehead as well? That is the main point in the second chapter of this article.
Two Versions of Panentheism
It is not difficult to indicate the main point of difference between classical theism (in Aquinas' exposition in particular) on the one side, and the Hegelian and Whitehedian understanding of God on the other. The demarcation line is the concept of God's simplicity, which serves as a ground for all key attributes described in the first part of the Summa Theologiae. For God's supreme perfection, goodness, eternity, immutability, omniscience and omnipotence, are all rooted in Aquinas' basic assertion that God is simple, that is free from any metaphysical compositions (form and matter, substance and accidents, essence and existence). Thus understood the concept of God's transcendence and independence of the world is complementary in Summa Theologiae with God's immanence, defined as his existence in everything "as an agent is present to that in which its action is taking place." According to Aquinas God is everywhere and "fills all places by giving existence to everything occupying those places."
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This understanding of God's nature was challenged by both Hegel and Whitehead.
Although they want to preserve the dynamics of transcendence and immanence in God, nevertheless, they unanimously deny God's simplicity. The Hegelian Spirit unfolding in time and positing itself in Nature and Human Beings resembles the Whitehedian God dependent in his consequent nature on non-divine actual occasions. Implicit in their philosophy is the idea of God including the world in his being. Thus they embrace - 36 In order to make this comparison between Hegelian and Whitehedian metaphysic more complete one should study two more issues: 1) the influence of British Romantic poetry of Coleridge and Wordsworth on Whitehead, and 2) a critical analysis of Whitehead's references to other philosophers, especially Locke and Hume. The first problem has been analyzed by Antoon Braeckman in "Whitehead and although none of them explicitly -a panentheistic notion of God-world relation. 38 However, there are some important nuances and differences between them which are often lost in the application of their metaphysics to theology. We should try to bring them into discussion.
Hegel as Panentheist
Trying to present Hegel's concept of God, we begin usually with the reference to his Idea or Spirit which posits itself in Nature and Human Beings. This dialectical process, progressively realized in history, is for Hegel a necessary condition of God's full actuality. In order to prove that the Spirit is dialectical in its nature, Hegel refers to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which becomes "the pictorialization of the first person of the Hegelian primary triad" in his all-embracing scheme. 40 That his understanding of the Trinity is far from Christian orthodoxy, however, is unquestionable. McTaggart is right when he says that in Hegel "the Holy Ghost is the sole reality of the Trinity. In so far as 38 Panentheism ('pan' = all, 'en' = in, 'Theos' = God), anticipated in Egyptian and Indian thought, was developed in philosophical and theological traditions throughout the centuries (Plato, Neoplatonism, Pseudo-Dionysius, Nicholas of Cusa). In 1828 panentheism was proposed and defined in its modern version by Karl Krause. He coined the term Allingottlehre, which is based on the assertion that everything is in God, who at the same time surpasses all that he created. Proponents of panentheism emphasize God's active presence in the world and place themselves in an opposition to the traditional theism, which they find as isolating God from the world. They reformulate understanding of classic attributes of God, such as omnipotence, omniscience, immutability, eternity and impassibility. Panentheism finds many followers among theologians and philosophers of God. Those who remain critical about panentheistic position refer usually to the problem of precise understanding of the preposition 'in' in the definition of panentheism, and the problem of God's immanence that seems to be overrated by panentheists at the expense of his transcendence. To sum up, I claim that Hegel is rightly regarded a founder of contemporary panentheism. In his dynamic metaphysics the whole universe is an incarnation of the Spirit. Thus Hegel realizes the first part of the basic panentheistic assertion which says that the world is in God. In my analysis I tried to explain the way in which Hegelian metaphysics also strives to meet the other requirement of panentheism, that is its emphasis on God's otherness from the universe. Nevertheless, I claim that the Hegelian concept of God-world relation -although departing significantly from classical theism -is still relatively close to the Thomistic understanding of divine causality. As we shall see, this position will prove to be somehow different in comparison with the one presented by Whitehead. Following his own general rule which says that "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, (…) He is their chief exemplification," Whitehead places God among other actual entities. What distinguishes him is his non-temporal nature in which God prehends all eternal objects and does not perish. Thus God becomes the Ground of all possibilities in the world. This is the primordial, conceptual nature of God in which he has a subjective aim, that is to constitute eternal objects through concrescence into relevant lures of feeling (propositions of future novelty for prehending actual occasions). Thus understood, God is the "unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality." 51 However, all these characteristics of the primordial nature of God do not make him a transcendent Creator of the universe. According to Whitehead "He is not before all creation, but with all creation." Moreover, in his primordial nature God is deficiently actual. Therefore we "must ascribe to him neither fullness of feeling, nor consciousness." 52 50 Ibid. 263 . 51 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 87-8, 343. 52 Ibid., This lack of perfection in God is fulfilled in his consequent nature which is "the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe." 53 That is the way in which the world is objectified in God who is now fully conscious. 54 Thus, in a way similar to actual entities, God's nature is dipolar. But that is not all. Both primordial and consequent natures of God are finally sublated to the superjective nature of God which is "the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances." 55 In order to understand this obscure definition one should refer to the concept of 'creativity' in Whitehead. God has satisfaction from qualifying the creativity. It turns out that creativity is the most basic category of the universe, conforming everything, including God. It is "the ultimate principle of novelty, 56 (…) another rendering of the Aristotelian 'matter', and of the modern 'neutral stuff.' But it is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of 'form,' or of external relations." 57 Although creativity is "conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world", that is conditioned by God in whom all actual entities are objectified, "in the philosophy of organism the ultimate is termed 'creativity'; and God is its primordial, non-temporal accident."
Whitehead as Panentheist
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All this helps us to understand Whitehedian panentheism in which God seems to be devoid of almost all of transcendence. Because actual entities share with God the characteristic of self-causation, they can also transcend all other actual entities, including
God. 59 We read in Process and Reality that God is merely "the outcome of creativity, the foundation of order, and the goad towards novelty." 60 Since actual entities constructing reality have the power of self-actualization (they decide themselves what they prehend), God ceases to be the Creator of the universe which itself is everlasting. All he can do is propose which eternal objects each actual entity should prehend in the future, and give to 53 
The Hegelian and the Whitehedian Panentheisms compared
In the conclusion of this chapter I will now compare the two versions of panentheism described above. I will start with the differences, as they are more evident.
They refer mainly to the crucial issue for panentheism in its dispute with classical theism, that is the relation between God's transcendence and immanence.
Like all panentheists, both Hegel and Whitehead struggle to defend God's
otherness. From what has been said one can see that the Hegelian God is more transcendent. He is still the Creator who can be conceived before the existence of the world. We also saw that Hegel's dialectic helps to save God's freedom. On the contrary, the Whitehedian God is less free, as he has to necessarily prehend and objectify in his consequent nature all actual occasions. He is not a creator anymore, but rather a part of the atomistic system of the universe. There is no creatio ex nihilo. This limitation of God's role in his relation to the world is well-described by Leftow who says: "While in Hegel the world is for God and God is for nothing beyond Himself, in Whitehead God and the world are for the sake of each other, and both are 'instruments' of Creativity." 63 Gregerson goes even further and says that " [o] n this point there is hardly a mediation possible between
Hartshorne and the understanding of divine causality in the Abrahamic tradition, which was also presupposed by Hegel. 
Panentheism in the Science-Theology Dialogue
Knowing the points of convergence and divergence between Hegelian and Whitehedian panentheism as described above, I will now try to trace the presence of these two philosophical traditions within the framework of the science/theology dialogue in the Anglo-American context. I will refer to Barbour, Peacocke, and Clayton.
Ian Barbour
Focusing his research on the philosophical and theological implications of quantum mechanics, the theory of relativity, the big bang theory, evolutionary biology 
Arthur Peacocke
The method presented by Arthur Peacocke in his writings on theology and science raises some important questions. Like other authors in the field, Peacocke shaped his theology with respect to the knowledge of the world that is given in natural sciences.
Being a biochemist, he perceived the world as a complex and dynamic system of countless interactions inside and between different levels of organization of matter. He emphasized the importance of the emergence of complexity, the role of necessity and chance, and both top-down and bottom-up causation. Similar to others he also claimed that this notion of the world provided by natural sciences challenges our faith. Thus, he opted for a radical reformulation of God's attributes and the concept of his relation to the world. 76 What is exceptional about Peacocke's theology is that in order to reshape our concept of God, he embraces panentheism, but at the same time distances himself from any philosophical framework for this position. Knowing that his theology is regarded as being close to the process tradition of thought, Peacocke claims that panentheism as such is "not at all dependent on that particular metaphysical system." 77 At the same time, he does not offer any other philosophical point of reference or source for his panentheism.
I find the position presented by Peacocke highly debatable. In my opinion it is hard to ignore the whole philosophical analysis and discussion of God's transcendence and immanence in the context of the philosophical notion of panentheism. After all, these problems are at the very heart of the definition of panentheism and are crucial for its application in theology.
Philip Clayton
The position presented by Philip Clayton is very interesting. As a philosopher he knows and elaborates quite well on the whole trajectory in modern thought leading to the philosophy of subject and panentheism in German Idealism. 78 He also knows the Whitehedian philosophy of process and his version of panentheism. It seems that Clayton wants to bring these two traditions together, and he does it in a very specific way.
Clayton values the long tradition of continental philosophy. That is why, when embracing panentheism, he refers first to German Idealism. But surprisingly, it is not
Hegel that would become for Clayton the main point of reference. In the last chapter of
The Problem of God in Modern Thought he expresses his commitment to Shelling and his idea of a personal God, choosing freely to create and thus self-manifesting himself, having history and destiny, growing and developing in time. 79 Clayton finds Hegel too close to the Aristotelian tradition, especially the idea of the first principle, which conditions all entities without being conditioned by them. 80 He says that this is a typical position accepted by different philosophers of the Absolute, such as Hegel. 81 What he disapproves of in Hegelian metaphysics is the necessity with which the Absolute has to posit itself in creation, a requirement of the system of which the Absolute is an indispensable part. He goes on to say that being close to this tradition Hegel "fails to preserve the contingency and the mystery of the decision to create." 82 That is why Clayton prefers Schelling's personal notion of God and his focus on freedom. 83 Clayton's distancing himself from the In his search for a notion of God more personal then Hegel's Absolute, Clayton sides not only with Shelling. In God and Contemporary Science he refers to the philosophy of organism. I think he does it mainly because of the emphasis on God's affectivity and reciprocity in process thought. This notion matches his stressing the personal character of God's nature. 84 He also sides with the process concept of dipolar God which he finds first present in Schelling's idealism. 85 However, Clayton mentions the philosophy of organism only occasionally and does not address the whole problem of God's transcendence and immanence in Whitehead, of which he must be aware as a philosopher. Nor does he go deeper into an analysis of differences between Whitehead and those who further developed his thought. These are important shortcomings of his position. Nevertheless, it is significant that Clayton, when choosing panentheism, refers to both philosophical traditions analyzed in this article. Moreover, his position shows that there are some subtle differences and nuances among various versions of panentheism, not only in the comparison of dialectical and process thought, but also within German Idealism itself (Hegel contra Schelling).
Conclusion
The aim of this article was threefold. In the first part I presented a critical analysis of possible similarities and differences between Hegel's metaphysic of dialectic and Whitehead's philosophy of organism. I think that as builders of philosophical systems, departing from substance to subject, and emphasizing the dynamic character of reality, they both can be regarded as proponents of philosophical concepts that are similar to a certain extent. Although the comparison of the mechanism of dialectic and process raises some critical questions, it seems possible that the Hegelian metaphysics, transmitted and transformed by British Idealists, reached Whitehead and influenced his philosophy of organism. I claim that the notion of this trajectory is of a great importance for those who accept the philosophy and theology of process. 84 Clayton, God and Contemporary Science, 94. 85 Clayton, The Problem of God in Modern Thought, God and Contemporary Science, The second part of the article was dedicated to philosophical panentheism in its two versions presented by Hegel and Whitehead. I tried to show particular nuances, divergences and convergences between these two philosophers. The level at which Hegel and Whitehead differ in their departure from the classical Thomistic understanding of divine causality and the God-world relation is significant. It has a great influence on the understanding of God's transcendence and immanence in their philosophical systems. I think that all this cannot be ignored by those who embrace the panentheistic position as a metaphysical background for their theological work.
The final part of the article, brought to discussion three main authors referring to panentheism in the contemporary science/theology debate in the Anglo-American context. I found the process version of panentheism to be more popular in these circles.
Barbour embraces it wholeheartedly. Clayton introduces it as a point of reference in his analysis based on Shelling's metaphysics. Peacocke -although he distances himself from
Whitehead and his successors -seems to be close to the philosophy of organism as well.
The notion of Hegel's panentheism is much less present in the thought of those involved in the science/theology dialogue. What I found particularly missing among the participants of this debate was a deeper study and analysis of possible similarities and dissimilarities between Hegel and Whitehead. This lacuna is especially noticeable regarding the problem of God's transcendence and immanence, which seems to be crucial for every panentheist.
I tried to show in this article that there is an important level of resemblance between process and Hegelian metaphysics. I hope that the awareness of this fact will be helpful for those who choose panentheism as the philosophical ground for their understanding of God and his relation to the world.
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